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COMMENT
CHILDREN'S TELEVISION: THE FCC'S
ATTEMPT TO EDUCATE AMERICA'S
CHILDREN MAY FORCE THE SUPREME
COURT TO RECONSIDER THE RED LION
RATIONALE
Roxana Wizorek +
The Federal Communications Commission1 (FCC or the Commission)
is charged with regulating interstate and foreign communications by ra-
dio, television, wire, satellite, and cable Under the Communications
Act of 1934, Congress delineated the Commission's jurisdiction and
authority.' Like many other federal agencies, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission's existence is attributable to the complexities of mod-
+ J.D. candidate, May 1998, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. The Federal Communications Commission is an independent federal administra-
tive agency responsible directly to Congress. See Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47
U.S.C. § 151 (1994) (creating the FCC). The FCC's jurisdiction covers the 50 states, the
District of Columbia, and the United States territories and possessions. See id. The FCC
is controlled by five Commissioners appointed for five-year terms by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. See JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 185 (1991).
2. See 47 U.S.C. § 152 (1994). Government regulation of communications com-
menced in 1910 with the granting of radio frequencies by the Secretary of Commerce. See
Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 81 (1994) (repealed 1934). At that time, the
authority of the Secretary of Commerce did not encompass the complete power to regu-
late radio operations. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617 (N.D. I11.
1926) (concluding that the legislation did not permit the Secretary of Commerce to limit
the use of frequency and hours of broadcast); 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 126, 131 (1926) (con-
cluding that the Communications Act did not empower the Secretary of Commerce with
authority to regulate the assignment of wave lengths). Recognizing the need to maintain
order in the radio industry, Congress established the Federal Radio Commission (FRC).
See 47 U.S.C. § 83 (repealed 1934). The Radio Act of 1927 authorized the FRC to super-
vise radio broadcasting. See id. §§ 81-83. Pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934,
Congress transferred the FRC's authority to regulate radio to the FCC. See id. § 151.
3. See 47 U.S.C. § 152. The Communications Act of 1934 is the FCC's enabling
statute that continues to provide the framework for FCC regulatory action. See THOMAS
G. KRATrENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 20 (1994).
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ern technology that forced Congress to delegate some of its responsibili-
ties to a specialized administrative body.4
Educational television is one such technological development.5 Dis-
satisfied with the status of children's educational television, Congress en-
acted the Children's Television Act of 1990 (CTA or the Act).6 The
CTA's objectives are "to increase the amount of educational and infor-
mational broadcast television programming available to children and to
protect children from overcommercialization of programming."7
Through the promulgation of general guidelines, the CTA mandates
that, in reviewing television license renewal applications, the FCC must
consider whether the licensee has served the educational and informa-
tional needs of children.8 To increase the amount of children's educa-
tional and informational programs available on television, Congress en-
acted the CTA to provide the FCC with general guidelines for regulating
children's television.9
Although the standards established in the CTA are extremely broad,
the Act requires the Commission to complete rulemaking proceedings
and prescribe standards for commercial television broadcasts within 180
days of its enactment.'0 After a lengthy stalemate,' the Commission fi-
4. See WALTER GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 5-6
(1941); THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN A
FREE SOCIETY 111 (1972); Peter Marra, Comment, Have Administrative Agencies Aban-
doned Reasonability?, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 763, 767 (1996) (noting that "[tihe justi-
fications for the delegation of congressional power to administrative agencies include
Congress's inability to handle technical issues and act efficiently and effectively").
5. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting that the FCC was established due
to modern technological developments).
6. See Children's Television Act of 1990, tits. 1, 11, §§ 103, 203, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(a)-
(b), 394 (1994).
7. S. REP. No. 101-227, at 1 (1989).
8. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(b). The CTA also requires the FCC to adopt rules limiting
the duration of advertising that broadcasters air during children's television programming.
See id. § 303a(b).
9. See id. §§ 303(a), 303b (affording the FCC broad discretion in implementing and
regulating television).
10. See id. § 303(a) (mandating that rulemaking proceedings be initiated within 30
days of the enactment of the statute).
11. See In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming; Revi-
sion of Programming Policies for Television Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 10660, 10771 (1996) [hereinafter Report and Order] (Chong, Comm'r, concurring
in part) (comparing the process of adopting the rule to the process of making sausage by
noting that "[ilt was not a pleasant or pretty process"). After lengthy debate, the FCC
promulgated regulations that established a minimum amount of children's educational
programming that broadcasters are required to air. See FCC Sets Regulation for Minimum
Level of Educational TV, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1996, at B3.
[Vol. 47:153
Children's Television
nally adopted a rule that demands more than the equivocal obligation of
broadcasters, as required by the CTA and previous FCC rulings. 2 In
August 1996, the FCC strengthened the requirement for children's edu-
cational and informational programming by requiring broadcasters to air
three hours of children's educational and informational programming per
week. 3 Additionally, the rules marked the first time in which the FCC
attempted to articulate a more precise definition of "educational and in-
formational programming.
14
This Comment first analyzes the development of the FCC's jurisdiction
to increase the educational and informational programming available to
children on commercial television. Second, this Comment reviews the
FCC's regulation mandating quantitative programming guidelines for
children's television. Third, this Comment examines the CTA, as well as
the FCC's quantitative requirement for children's educational and in-
formational programming under the lens of the First Amendment. This
Comment examines constitutional limits on content regulation in the
context of governmental regulation of television broadcasting. This con-
stitutional analysis demonstrates that disparate results arise depending
on whether the constitutionality of laws on children's television is meas-
ured under a traditional strict scrutiny standard or the less onerous stan-
dard applied to broadcast media. This Comment concludes that while
the FCC's regulation may fall within the bounds of contemporary First
Amendment standards for television broadcasting, such a standard is
out-dated due to the vastly increased availability of electronic mass me-
dia outlets.
12. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 2; Editorial, Clinton's Push for More
Kid TV, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 1, 1996, at 22 (noting that the CTrA did not adequately apprise
broadcasters of how to serve the educational and informational needs of children within
the meaning of the CTA).
13. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 120. As of January 2, 1997, broadcast-
ers are required either to air three hours of children's educational and informational pro-
gramming, or demonstrate to the FCC that they are otherwise committed to meeting the
educational and informational needs of children. See id. The FCC rule does not apply to
cable television. See Clinton Agrees to an Increase in Educational TV Shows for Children,
CHI. TRIB., July 29,1996, at 3.
14. See Report and Order, supra note 11, paras. 76-80. Under the express language of
the CTA, educational and informational television programming is defined as "any televi-
sion program which is directed to an audience of children who are 16 years of age or
younger and which is designed for the intellectual development of those children..." 47
U.S.C. § 394(i)(1) (1994).
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1. THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPACT OF THE FCC's JURISDICTION WITH
RESPECT TO CHILDREN'S EDUCATIONAL AND INFORMATIONAL
PROGRAMMING
Recognizing the tremendous influence television exerts on young
audiences, Congress sought to ensure that television would serve chil-
dren's educational needs.15  Studies conducted by Nielsen Media Re-
search reveal that children between the ages of two and seventeen watch
at least three hours of television per day. 6 Furthermore, Congress cited
15. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 9. Congress noted the benefits of tele-
vision programs as sources of educational and informational value to children:
In enacting the CTA, Congress cited research demonstrating that television pro-
grams designed to teach children specific skills are effective. There is substantial
evidence in this proceeding that children can benefit greatly from viewing educa-
tional television. That television has the power to teach is important because
nearly all American children have access to television and spend considerable
time watching it.
Broadcast Services; Children's Television, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,981, 43,992 (1996) (to be codi-
fied at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
Television affects several areas of American society, including: "family life and sociali-
zation; religion; laws and norms; leisure; public security; citizenship." George Comstock,
Television and American Social Institutions, in CHILDREN AND TELEVISION 27 (John C.
Wright & Aletha C. Huston eds., 3d ed. 1983). On one level, researchers have noted that
television reduces the time one spends in conversation, including interaction among family
members. See id. At 28. In addition, some researchers maintain that television serves as a
source of vicarious socialization. See id. At 29. It also has been noted that television re-
duces viewers' involvement in various activities and hobbies. See id.
Several Senators recently reiterated their belief that television is a "uniquely pervasive
presence" in the lives of Americans. Television Improvement Act of 1997, S. 471, 105th
Cong. § 2. Congress found that the average American home owns 2.5 televisions and the
television is watched on an average of seven hours per day. See id.; see also HARVEY
LESSER, TELEVISION AND THE PRESCHOOL CHILD: A PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF
INSTRUCTION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT 69 (1977) (arguing that because the
depiction of events on a television screen does not affect children's ongoing interaction
among objects and people, "television is weakest in the exact spot where children need the
most help"). But cf Valeria 0. Lovelace & Aletha C. Huston, How Can Television Teach
Prosocial Behavior? in CHILDREN AND TELEVISION, supra, at 145 (noting that broadcast-
ers' attempts to include prosocial content on television may not always have a positive ef-
fect on viewers).
16. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 11 (citing NIELSEN MEDIA
RESEARCH, TELEVISION AUDIENCE 1993, at 14 (1993)). It is estimated that by the time
the average American child enters the first grade, he "will have spent the equivalent of
three school years in front of the television set." Id. para. 12. By contrast, an average
eighteen-year-old child will have spent fewer than 13,000 hours in a class room. See In re
Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming; Revision of Program-
ming Policies for Television Broadcast Stations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10
F.C.C.R. 6308, para. 9 (1995). But Cf. Geraldine Fabrikant, The Young and Restless Audi-
ence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1996, at DI (announcing that according to Nielsen Media Re-
search, the average weekly number of hours that children ages 2 to 11 spend watching
television has dropped by approximately eighteen percent since 1984).
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research indicating that television programs specifically designed to edu-
cate children can be extremely effective in influencing the perceptions,
values, and behaviors of children.17
The effectiveness of television as a pedagogical vehicle, coupled with
the considerable time that children spend watching television, prompted
Congress to investigate the status of children's broadcasting.18 Congress
discovered that many broadcasters aired a minimal amount of children's
educational and informational programming 9 For example, according
to the National Association of Broadcasters, some stations are airing an
average of only two hours of children's educational programming per
week.20
A. The Children's Television Act of 1990
Dissatisfied with the status of children's television programming, Con-
gress enacted the CTA to enhance the quality and increase the quantity
of children's educational commercial television." In enacting the CTA,
Congress had two goals: (1) to limit the duration of advertising aired
during children's programming; and (2) to provide children with more
educational and informational programming. To achieve these goals,
17. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 9. Congress found that next to family,
television is probably a child's most influential teacher. See id. para. 12 (citing S. REP. No.
101-227, at 5 (1989)). Congress also found that television has an enormous capability to
influence the perceptions, values, and behaviors of children. See Television Improvement
Act of 1997, S. 471, 105th Cong. § 2. But see CEDRIC CULLINGFORD, CHILDREN AND
TELEVISION 98-104 (1984) (questioning the actual benefit of television). Despite the be-
lief that television can educate children, the actual result has been disappointing. See id. at
98. The best example of this is the program "Sesame Street." See id. at 101. Despite all
the publicity and the pleasure that parents derive from it, Sesame Street is not making
much impact on children. See id. at 102.
18. Cf. Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 8 (explaining that in evaluating the ef-
ficiency of children's television, Congress relied, in part, on the broadcast industry to ad-
vance the important interest of educating young viewers).
19. See id. para. 44. According to the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB),
commercial broadcasters were dedicating only two hours of airtime to children's educa-
tional programming prior to the enactment of the CTA in 1990. See id. In 1996, NAB
studies revealed that some broadcasters were airing fewer than the two hours the CTA
intended to increase. See id.
20. See id.
21. Cf. 47 U.S.C. § 303a (1994) (instructing the FCC to promulgate "standards appli-
cable to commercial television broadcast licensees with respect to the time devoted to
commercial matter in conjunction with children's television programming"). Congress
determined that "market forces were not sufficient to ensure that commercial stations
would provide children's educational and information programming." Report and Order,
supra note 11, para. 29.
22. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 21. Because cable systems finance
their programming through fees paid by cable subscribers, they do not have to depend on
1997]
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the CTA limits the duration of advertising in children's television pro-
gramming to 10.5 minutes per hour on weekends and 12 minutes per
hour on weekdays.23 Additionally, Congress mandated that broadcasters
air educational and informational programs and required the FCC to en-
force this obligation.24
The CTA imposed several obligations on the FCC. First, the Act re-
quires the FCC to promulgate and define broadcast standards with re-
spect to commercial television broadcast licenses. 25 Accordingly, the
Commission defined educational and informational programming as
"any television programming that furthers the educational and informa-
tional needs of children 16 years of age and under in any respect, includ-
ing children's intellectual/cognitive or social/emotional needs., 26  The
FCC interpreted the CTA's programming renewal requirement as appli-
cable to programs produced and broadcasted for children sixteen years
27of age and younger.
Second, the FCC is required to enforce the CTA's requirements.' The
CTA requires the FCC to review licensees' compliance with the Act
when commercial broadcasters seek renewal of broadcast licenses. 9 Im-
plicitly, the CTA authorizes the Commission to deny renewal of a broad-
cast license for insufficient compliance with standards for children's edu-
cational television. °
The broadcast industry's good-faith efforts to provide educational pro-
gramming for children is crucial to the success of the CTA's objectives.
advertisers for revenue, while commercial broadcast stations providing free programming
are extremely dependent on advertising for the revenue they earn. See Turner Broad. Sys.
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 629 (1994). The importance of commercial television is rein-
forced by the fact that thirty-seven percent of children from the ages of 2 to 11 and thirty-
eight percent of children from the ages of 12 to 17 live in homes that do not have access to
cable television. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 11.
23. See 47 U.S.C. § 303a(b).
24. See id. § 303a(a).
25. See id.; see also William E. Kennard & Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Heeding Con-
gress' Call on Kids' TV, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 8, 1996, at 29 (noting that the broad language
of the CTA requires that the FCC "spell out precisely what broadcasters must do").
26. Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 79. Congress used the program "Fat Al-
bert and the Cosby Kids" as an example of a program that served the cognitive/intellectual
or social/emotional needs of children because it dealt with issues such as drug use, divorce,
friendship, and child abuse. See S. REP. NO. 101-227, at 7 (1989).
27. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 79
28. See 47 U.S.C. § 303b(a).
29. See id. § 303b(a)(1).
30. See id.
31. Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 22 (emphasizing the significance of broad-
caster compliance with the rules promulgated under the CTA as illustrated by § 303b(a)
that requires the Commission to review the extent to which a licensee has served the edu-
[Vol. 47:153
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Apart from a broad definition of educational and informational pro-
gramming, however, the CTA provides little guidance for television
broadcasters." For example, the Act establishes no minimum time re-
quirement for the children's educational and informational programming
that broadcasters must provide.33 The FCC initially declined to adopt
quantitative processing guidelines, in fear of trespassing on the broad-
caster's preserved right to exercise discretion regarding how appropri-
ately to meet the educational and informational needs of 
children?4
Consistent with congressional intent, licensees were able to determine
the nature of children's educational and informational programming they
aired and the quantity of the programming to air.3"
B. Noncompliance on the Part of Broadcasters
Six years after the enactment of the CTA, some broadcasters contin-
ued to provide an insufficient amount of educational and informational
programming for children." Studies revealed that some broadcasters
cational and informational needs of children in determining whether license renewal is
appropriate).
32. Congress did not clearly articulate how television broadcasters would serve the
educational and informational needs of children, leaving the FCC the task of constructing
and implementing specific regulations. See Paul Farhi, Broadcasters Pledge 3 Hours of
'Educational' TV a Week, WASH. POST, July 30, 1996, at Al (noting that the FCC must
determine what programs satisfy the "educational and informational" standard under the
CTA); Kennard & Nuechterlein, supra note 25, at 29 (emphasizing that Congress dele-
gated to the FCC the task of articulating precise standards applicable to children's televi-
sion broadcasting).
33. See In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming; Revi-
sion of Programming Policies for Television Broadcast Stations, Notice of Inquiry, 8
F.C.C.R. 1841, para. 7 (1993) [hereinafter Notice of Inquiry] (positing that the lack of
growth in childrens' programming may be attributed to broadcast licensees uncertainty
with respect to the scope of their programming obligations).
34. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 158 (quoting Comments of The Media
Institute to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in MM Dkt. No. 93-48, at 16-17 (Oct. 11,
1995)).
35. See Notice of Inquiry, supra note 33, para. 4.
36. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 36. However, the FCC notes that
studies examining the amount of regularly scheduled standard length educational televi-
sion programming are inconclusive. See id. para. 35. Such studies arrive at different con-
clusions, in part, because of the difficulty in defining children's educational and informa-
tional programming. See id. para. 36. Nevertheless, the Commission explained that these
studies do conclude that some broadcasters are providing only a limited amount of educa-
tional and informational programming for children. See id.
Recently, Senator Brownback relied on several independent analyses when determining
that broadcasters have not fulfilled their obligation under the CTA. See Television Im-
provement Act of 1997, S. 471, 105th Cong. § 2. Sen. Brownback noted that television
broadcasters "have not noticeably expanded the amount of educational and informational
programming directed at young viewers." Id.
19971
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were providing fewer than two hours of children's educational and in-
formational programming per week.37 Although the purpose of the CTA
was to increase the two hour per week average of children's educational
and informational programming, the CTA's goals were not being• 38
achieved. The delinquent broadcasters failed to comply for two rea-
sons: (1) low ratings produced by children's television;39 and (2) insuffi-
cient guidance from the CTA.40
1. Lack of Advertising Dollars
The low ratings generated by children's television programming and
the even lower ratings of children's educational programming contrib-
uted to noncompliance among some broadcasters 1.4  Low television rat-
ings translate into lower advertising revenue for advertisers, and ulti-
42mately, decreased profits for broadcasters. Because of this disincentive,
broadcasters were reluctant to air more educational and informational
programming for children. 3
2. The Vagueness of the Children's Television Act
The vagueness of the CTA also contributed to the broadcasters' non-
compliance. 44 The CTA merely obligates broadcasters to provide chil-
dren's educational and informational programming.45 Although the FCC
37. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 41.
38. See id.
39. See id. para. 33. Accordingly, broadcasters were reluctant to air more educational
programs because such programs produced low ratings. See Clinton's Push for More Kid
TV, supra note 12, at 22.
40. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 36 (concluding that the CTA provided
television broadcasters with insufficient guidance).
41. See id. para. 34 (surmising that because broadcasters who air a substantial amount
of children's television are commercially disadvantaged as compared to those who do not,
even broadcasters who want to air such programming may choose not to do so); see also
KRATTENMAKER, supra note 3, at 21 (stressing that the "central driving force" of the tele-
vision industry is the "quest of local broadcast stations for advertising dollars").
42. See Elizabeth Jensen & Albert R. Karr, Summit on Kids' TV Yields Compromise:
FCC is Expected to Endorse New Program Guidelines, But Will the Audience?, WALL ST.
J., July 30, 1996, at B14 (observing that children's educational programs typically "get low
ratings and thus, lower advertising rates").
43. See Clinton's Push for More Kid TV, supra note 12, at 22; James J. Popham, Pas-
sion, Politics and the Public Interest: The Perilous Path to a Quantitative Standard in the
Regulation of Children's Television Programming, 5 COMMLAW CONSPEcrus 1, 19 (1997)
(predicting that broadcasters will air only the minimum amount of children's television as
required by the FCC, "no more, no less").
44. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text (discussing the causes of the broad-
casters', non-compliance with respect to the CTA).
45. Cf. Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 80 (arguing that the newly adopted
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currently defines "educational and informational programming" as tele-
vision programming that advances the positive development of children
sixteen years of age and younger in terms of their "intellectual/cognitive
or social/emotional needs," this definition still affords considerable dis-
cretion to television broadcasters.4 For example, the FCC delegated to
television broadcasters the final authority to determine which programs
qualify as educational and informational within the meaning of the
CTA.
4 7
C. The Long Road to Adopting a Stricter Rule for Television
Broadcasters
1. The FCC's Attempts to Implement a Three Hour Per Week
Requirement for Children's Educational Programming
Because the CTA and the FCC rules promulgated thereunder lacked suf-
ficient guidance, the FCC sought to articulate more precise and definite
standards for broadcasters seeking to comply with the Act.48 These ini-
tial attempts to strengthen the requirements of the CTA drew significant
criticism. 49 FCC Chairman Reed E. Hundt and Commissioner Susan
Ness favored a draft order prescribing a three hour per week minimum
definition of "educational and informational programming" will maintain broadcasters'
current discretion in selecting the content of children's programming that they air). In re-
viewing any applications for license renewal, the FCC will determine whether the broad-
caster has met its obligation to children's programming. See 47 U.S.C. § 303b (1994).
46. Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 79 (defining educational and informational
television). Broadcasters characterized television shows such as "The Flintstones" and
"The Jetsons" as educational. See Press Briefing by Greg Simon, Chief Domestic Policy
Advisor for the Vice-President 4 (July 29, 1996) (transcript available from the White
House, Office of the Press Secretary).
47. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 80. Congress allowed the FCC to pro-
vide broadcasters with their exact obligations. See Kennard & Nuechterlein, supra note
25, at 29.
48. See Notice of Inquiry, supra note 33, para. 1.
49. See FCC Sets Regulation for Minimum Level of Educational TV, supra note 11, at
B3 (noting that Commissioners Quello and Chong denounced any proposed FCC regula-
tions that posed an unwarranted threat to the First Amendment rights of TV broadcast-
ers); see also Chris McConnell, Kids TV Accord Reached, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
Aug. 5, 1996, at 5 (noting that the passage of the three-hour children's television require-
ment marked the end to a "months-long FCC stalemate"). Senior Commissioner James
Quello sought to avoid the imposition of intrusive regulations that would violate the First
Amendment. See James H. Quello, The FCC's Regulatory Overkill, WALL ST. J., July 24,
1996, at A20. On the other side of the debate, Chairman Reed Hundt strongly advocated
the quantitative programming requirements. See Chairman Reed E. Hundt, Address at
the National Press Club (July 27, 1995) <http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/
spreh517.txt>.
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for children's educational and informational programming. 0 Commis-
sioners Rachelle Chong and Jim Quello, however, unequivocally de-
nounced the stricter proposal and individually voiced their concerns over
the proposed definition of children's educational and informational pro-
gramming." Thus, the FCC was deadlocked for months, unable to fur-
nish more specific rules for television broadcasters. 2
2. President Clinton's Children's Television Summit
Due to the approaching November presidential election and the FCC's
inability to agree upon standards for broadcasters, President Clinton met
with representatives from the broadcasting industry and children's televi-
sion advocates to negotiate a resolution aimed at enriching children's
television. 3 All parties eventually agreed to the proposal favored by
Commissioners Ness and Hundt that required broadcasters to air three
hours of children's educational and informational programs per week in
order to renew their licenses. Under the proposal, the three hours of
programming consisted of regularly scheduled thirty-minute programs."
The agreement between broadcasters and the President hinged on an
alternative provision that granted flexibility to television broadcasters. 6
50. See FCC Sets Regulation for Minimum Level of Educational TV, supra note 11, at
B3.
51. See id.
52. See McConnell, supra note 49, at 5.
53. The Children's Television Conference was held on July 29, 1996. See President
William J. Clinton, Remarks at the Children's Television Conference (July 29, 1996), in 32
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1362 (Aug. 5, 1996) [hereinafter Clinton Address]. During
the Conference, President Clinton urged the FCC to adopt the three hours per week pro-
posal supported by Commissioners Ness and Hundt. See id. at 1363.
54. See Clinton Address, supra note 53, at 1363; McConnell, supra note 49, at 5; see
also Clinton Agrees to an Increase in Educational TV Shows for Children, supra note 13, at
3 (noting the importance of the compromise to the president during an election year);
Farhi, supra note 32, at Al (noting that the compromise arises "amid a new round of
presidential campaign rhetoric about cultural values"); William Neikirk, Clinton Calls for
Summit on Kids' TV, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 1996, at 4 (noting that the President's request
for more children's television "added another item to Clinton's campaign theme empha-
sizing family values").
55. See McConnell, supra note 49, at 5.
56. President Clinton noted that:
This proposal fulfills the promise of the Children's Television Act, that television
should serve the educational and informational needs of our young people. It
gives broadcasters flexibility in how to meet those needs. And it says to Amer-
ica's parents, you are not alone; we are all committed to working with you to see
that educational programming for your children makes the grade.
Clinton Address, supra note 53, at 1363; see also Chris McConnell, Burning the Midnight




This provision afforded leniency to broadcasters who air fewer than
three hours of programming per week by allowing the broadcasters to
substitute programming that is "equivalent" to the three-hour require-
ment.17 This alternate programming could include fifteen-minute pro-
grams, public service announcements, and specials."58
II. THE FCC-APPROVED REGULATION FOR MINIMAL LEVEL OF
EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION FOR CHILDREN
Bowing to intense pressure from President Clinton, the FCC eventu-
ally agreed to the compromise reached by the White House and the tele-
vision industry." The FCC's regulation not only imposes a quantitative
three-hour requirement on broadcasters, it also establishes an unequivo-
cal definition of educational and informational "core" programming.
6
0
The FCC recognized that the previous definition of educational and in-
formational programming was over-broad. 6' Therefore, the FCC sought
to adopt a more precise and definite definition of "core" programming,
namely programming that is "specifically designed to serve the educa-
tional and informational needs of children."62
A. Analysis of the FCC's Requirements for "Core" Programming
1. The Significant Purpose of the Program
In order to qualify as "core" programming, the purpose of the program
must be to serve the educational and informational needs of children
ages sixteen and younger. 63 Programming that communicates only a mi-
57. McConnell, supra note 49, at 5.
58. See Sheryl Stolberg & Jane Hall, Educational Children's TV Shows to Air; Media:
Networks Bow to Pressure from Clinton in Agreeing to Programming Three Hours a Week.
Pact is Considered Election-Year Coup for President, L.A. TIMES, July 30,1996, at A12.
59. The four Commissioners voted unanimously in favor of the plan announced at the
President's Television Summit. See FCC Sets Regulation for Minimum Level of Educa-
tional TV, supra note 11, at B3.
60. See Report and Order, supra note 11, paras. 78-80.
61. See id. para. 73.
62. Id.
63. See id. para. 79. The Commission opined that:
The "significant purpose" standard appropriately acknowledges the point ad-
vanced by broadcasters and others that to be successful, and thus to serve chil-
dren's needs as mandated by the CTA, educational and informational program-
ming must also be entertaining and attractive to children. Accordingly, .. . we
will require that core programming be specifically designed to meet the educa-
tional and informational needs of children ages 16 and under and have educating
and informing children as a significant purpose.
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nor educational or informational message, yet claims to serve the needs
of children, does not fall within the scope of the definition. 64 The FCC
"rel[ies] on the good-faith judgment of broadcasters," in determining
whether programming falls within the definition of "core" program-. 61
ming. In addition, the FCC relies on the public to monitor broadcaster
performance in complying with the regulation.
66
2. The Requirement of a Written Statement Specifying the Educational
and Informational Objective and Target Child Audience
The regulation also requires broadcasters to submit written statements
to the FCC outlining the educational and informational purpose of a
program intended to qualify as "core" programming. 67 The written
statement consists of a description of the program's educational and in-
formational objective, the program's expected educational and informa-
68tional effects, and an indication of the program's target age groups. The
written statement encourages the public to actively monitor broadcast
licensee compliance with the regulation.6 9
Broadcast Services; Children's Television, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,981, 43,985 (1996) (to be codi-
fied at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
CBS announced that it would comply with the new FCC ruling on children's television
by choosing the program "Beakman's World" to air on Saturday morning. See Steve
McClellan, CBS Programs Educational Saturday, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Dec. 9,
1996, at 38 [hereinafter McClellan, CBS Programs]. Because of the FCC's decision to
mandate three hours of children's educational and informational programming, one en-
trepreneur established the company, JP Kids, to produce and distribute children's pro-
gramming that meets the FCC requirements. See Steve McClellan, New Kids Program-
ming Producer Formed; With Help from Wall Street, Children's Advocate Launches JP
Kids, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Dec. 2, 1996, at 42. JP Kids founder, Jim Steyer, is also
the founder of the advocacy group, Children Now. See id. In addition to providing quality
children's programming for broadcast television, Steyer intends to aggressively pursue
various other media, such as cable and the Internet. See id. at 42-43.
64. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 81.
65. Id. para. 88.
66. See id.
67. See id. para. 93. Commercial television broadcasters are required to complete a
Children's Television Programming Report (Report) on a quarterly basis. See 47 C.F.R. §
73.3526(a)(8)(iii) (1996). The report is completed on FCC Form 398 and should identify
the efforts made to serve the educational and informational needs of children in the pre-
ceding quarter as well as the goals for the next quarter. See id.
68. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526(a)(8)(iii). Although the report must explain how the
designated programs satisfy the "core" programming requirement, the written statement
does not need to specify the viewpoint of the program. See id.
69. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 93. The FCC determined that the re-
quirement of a written statement of purpose "ensure[s] that broadcasters devote attention
to the educational and informational goals of core programming." Id. The written state-
ment distinguishes between programs that serve the educational and informational needs




"Core" programming must be aired between the hours of 7:00 A.M.
and 10:00 P.M. 70 These hours represent the period of time in which the
greatest number of children are in the audience." The 7:00 A.M. to 10:00
P.M. time limit became necessary because broadcasters preferred to air
children's programming during non-prime-time hours, which produced
low ratings and few advertising dollars.72
4. Regularly Scheduled Programming
"Core" programming also requires the children's television program to
be regularly scheduled. 73 A regularly scheduled program must air at least
once a week.74 Hence, specially. scheduled programming does not meet
the "core" requirement.75
This requirement reflects the FCC's view that regularly scheduled pro-1 6
grams are more likely to attract and maintain regular audiences.
Regularity of scheduling permits greater dissemination of information
about the program through published television guides and increases
18viewer loyalty through program anticipation. The FCC's rules, how-
ever, provide opportunities to evade the scheduling element of the
"core" program definition in two ways. 79 First, the FCC's rules do not es-
70. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.671(c)(2) (1996); see also Clinton's Push for More Kid TV, su-
pra note 12, at 22 (discussing the provisions of the agreement between President Clinton
and television broadcasters). The time period for "core" programming does not coincide
with the indecency safe harbor, which is between 10:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M. See Report and
Order, supra note 11, para. 102. The CBS network proposed airing children's programs
on Saturday from 7:00 A.M. until 9:00 A.M. and then from 11:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. to satisfy
FCC regulations. See McClellan, CBS Programs, supra note 63, at 38.
71. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 99. Less than five percent of children
between the ages of 2 and 17 watch television at 6:00 A.M. See id. The average number of
children viewers between the ages of 2 and 17 drops from thirteen million at 10:00 P.M. to
eight million at 11:00 P.M. See id. para. 101.
72. Cf. id. para. 100 (noting that airing children's educational and informational pro-
gramming during the early morning hours is less costly for broadcasters).
73. See id. para. 105. The FCC opined that adopting a "regularly scheduled" re-
quirement would foster the continued viewership of parents and children, encourage loy-
alty to a certain program, and reinforce educational and informational messages. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. para. 107.
76. See id. para. 105, 107.
77. See id. para. 107.
78. See id. para. 105.
79. See Stolberg & Hall, supra note 58, at A12 (outlining the "alternative" methods
by which broadcasters who fail to air three hours of core programming per week may
avoid losing their licenses).
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tablish a standard requiring broadcasters to air programs for a consecu-
tive number of weeks."" Second, the rules allow for preemption of "core"
programming with "breaking news" and "live sports events," and do not
limit the amount of preemption.81
5. Minimum Length of "Core" Programming
The FCC also requires that "core" programming be at least thirty-
minutes in duration." The thirty-minute format reflects current industry
practice, and the Commission determined that children's educational
programming should comport with this standard.83 Although the FCC
recognized that programs that are fewer than thirty-minutes in length
provide public interest benefits, shorter programs will not be credited as
"core" programming.4 The FCC opined that a thirty-minute program
format contributes to the accessibility of educational and informational
programming to children.85 This program format is more accessible be-
cause it is usually regularly scheduled, and listed in television program
guides that parents may read for more information about the program."'
6. Identification of a Children's Program as Educational and
Informational
The last element of "core" programming requires broadcasters to ac-
curately identify children's educational and informational program-
ming.87 The FCC adopted its initial proposal contained in the Notice of
Proposed Rule Making.m The FCC maintained that broadcast stations
80. Cf Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 106 (noting that serial programs usu-
ally air for 13 consecutive weeks, but have no consecutive week requirement).
81. See id. para. 106.
82. See id. para. 110. The FCC reasoned that the purpose of the length requirement
for children's educational and informational programming is to promote accessibility. See
id. The CBS network announced its intent to air educational and informational program-
ming for children in a two hour block between 7:00 A.M. and 9:00 A.M. and a one hour
block from 11:00 A.M. and 12:00 P.M. See McClellan, CBS Programs, supra note 63, at 38.
83. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 110.
84. See id. para. 112.
85. See id. para. 110.
86. See id.
87. See id. para. 113. By requiring station broadcasters to identify a core program as
educational and informational, the FCC intends to make this information available for
published program guides which enhances parental accessibility to such information. See
id. Furthermore, the FCC hopes that the identification requirement will promote greater
accountability among broadcasters in complying with the Commission's rules. See id.; cf
McClellan, CBS Programs, supra note 63, at 38 (discussing children's programming se-
lected to air during the 1997-98 season and identified as educational by CBS).
88. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 113 & n.265. Broadcasters had to
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must designate programs as educational and informational on television,
before they air, and also identify educational and informational programs
in published program guides."9 The FCC stated that holding broadcasters
responsible for the identification of programming will ensure that pro-
gramming is properly designated as educational and informational. 90 Ac-
cording to the Commission, identification also will facilitate parental
awareness, and assist in monitoring broadcasters' compliance with the
rule.9'
B. The Flexibility of the FCC Regulation
The FCC regulation incorporates a provision that gives television
broadcasters flexibility in complying with the Commission's rules.92 This
provision allows broadcasters who have not satisfied the six elements of
"6core" programming to comply with the license renewal requirements in
an alternative fashion.93 Absent a demonstration that the six elements
have been met, the processing guidelines prescribed under the FCC's
regulations allow for renewal by showing that the broadcaster offers a
programming package that is equivalent to the three-hour requirement.94
Broadcast licensees who fail to meet the FCC's quantitative guidelines
will have a "full opportunity to demonstrate compliance with the CTA."95
Licensees may demonstrate such compliance by exhibiting a "commit-
ment to educating and informing children that is at least equivalent to
airing three hours per week of core programming.9 6 Stations opting to
take this alternative method may use their sponsorship of educational
programming on other stations to show their commitment. 97 Further-
more, television stations may denote any "special non-broadcasting ef-
meet the processing guideline by the fall of 1997, while they had until only January 2, 1997
to meet the identification requirement. See id. paras. 160-61; Chris McConnell, Kids Icons
to Make Debut, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Dec. 16, 1996, at 28. In December 1996,
NBC, CBS, Fox, and UPN television networks notified program guide publishers of their
intent to use the symbol "E/I" to identify their educational and informational programs.
See id. The ABC network did not join in the announcement, but stated that it will also
establish a symbol for educational and informational programming for use in their pub-
lishers' guides. See id.
89. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 113.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See McConnell, supra note 56, at 8.
93. See McConnell, supra note 49, at 5.
94. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 133.
95. Id. para. 120.
96. Id. para. 133.
97. See id. para. 120.
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forts" that generally promote the value of educational and informational
television programming."
III. SCOPE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting any law that
abridges the freedom of speech. 99 However, the First Amendment has
been interpreted to permit certain limited restrictions on free expres-
sion. °° The Supreme Court has established a complex and sometimes
conflicting body of precedent in an effort to adjust the competing inter-
ests surrounding First Amendment litigation.ot A dominant principle in
First Amendment jurisprudence is that government regulations that im-
pose content-based restrictions on free speech are subject to the greatest
degree of judicial scrutiny19 Therefore, in deciding whether a govern-
ment restriction comports with the First Amendment, it is necessary first
to determine whether the restriction is content-based .
A. Distinguishing Content-Based from Content-Neutral Restrictions on
Speech
A fundamental principle applied in First Amendment jurisprudence is
the distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulation of
98. Id. para. 137.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Amendment in pertinent part provides that "Con-
gress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id.
100. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (rejecting the
view that freedom of speech and association are "absolutes"); see also GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1004 (12th ed. 1991) (examining whether First
Amendment rights are absolute); WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 614 (8th ed. 1996) (noting that laws that restrict certain modes of free expression are
commonplace).
101. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (invalidating a city ordi-
nance that prohibited protected speech); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416 (1989) (con-
cluding that flag burning is a form of protected speech). The Supreme Court has noted
that "above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
471 (1980) (invalidating an Illinois statute that prohibited picketing of residences or
dwellings when the pickets contained certain subject matter).
102. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 461-62 (explaining that government discrimination among
speech-related activities triggers a heightened standard of review); cf R.A. V., 505 U.S. at
381 (striking down an ordinance because it included otherwise lawful speech in its prohibi-
tion on certain types of speech); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (striking down a statute that "de-
scribes permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter").
103. Cf. Carey, 447 U.S. at 460-61 (determining whether the statute in question consti-
tuted a content-based or content-neutral restriction).
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speech.'" Content-based regulation involves the restriction of expression
based on its communicative impact.05 On the other hand, a content-
neutral regulation restricts speech without regard to the content of the
message. °6 These restrictions regulate merely the time, place, or manner
in which speech is permitted.' °7
1. Content-Based Regulations
Government regulations that govern the content of expression are
subject to strict judicial scrutiny.' Under the strict scrutiny standard, a
content-based regulation is presumptively invalid '°9 and will be upheld
only if it advances a compelling government interest10 and is narrowly
tailored... to effectuate that interest without infringing upon other forms
of protected expression.
104. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
16.47(a) (4th ed. 1991) (noting that restrictions on speech uttered in public places must not
discriminate based on the subject matter of expression).
105. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 790 (2d ed. 1988).
106. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994).
107. See id. (citing cases which addressed content-neutral regulations of free speech).
108. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (explaining that the government's
interest in restricting content-based expression must be subjected to "the most exacting
scrutiny").
109. Cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
123 (1991) (finding the "Son of Sam" law violative of the First Amendment because it
impermissibly burdens speech based on its content); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 659
(1984) (holding that a statute placing a purpose requirement on the photographic repro-
duction of any obligation or security of the United States is unconstitutional because it
amounted to a content-based restriction of speech).
In analyzing the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, one commentator
notes:
The Court apparently focuses. . . on the extent to which the speech furthers the
historical, political, and philosophical purposes that underlie the first amend-
ment. In making this determination, the Court applies a "defining out" ap-
proach. That is, the Court begins with the presumption that the first amendment
protects all communication and then creates areas of non-protection only after it
affirmatively finds that a particular class of speech does not sufficiently further
the underlying purposes of the first amendment.
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 194 (1983) (internal footnote omitted).
110. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 120-21 (finding a compelling government inter-
est in the Son of Sam law that transfers to victims compensation earned from the "fruits of
crime").
111. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 130-31 (1989) (holding that
a complete ban on indecent telephone messages was not narrowly tailored to advance the
compelling interest of shielding children from indecency).
112. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412, 420 (striking down a Texas statute that proscribed
flag burning after applying a strict scrutiny standard and concluding that the Texas statute
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The Supreme Court applied the strict scrutiny test in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo"3 where it struck down a content-based restric-
tion.1 4 Tornillo involved a Florida statute that granted a political candi-
date the right to require a newspaper to print a reply to the newspaper's
criticism of the candidate's personal character or official record."' Ap-
plying the strict scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court held the statute
unconstitutional because it forced newspapers to forgo publication of
other news."' Moreover the Court reiterated the principle that the gov-
ernment cannot invade the function of the newspaper editor."7
2. Content-Neutral Regulations
When evaluating content-neutral regulations, the Court employs a lessoneros stndar " 118
onerous standard of review. Content-neutral regulations are perceived
as a lesser burden on First Amendment rights, and, therefore, are sub-
ject to a more liberal intermediate level of scrutiny."2 Under this stan-
dard, a government regulation will be upheld if the regulation affects
conduct with both "speech" and "nonspeech" elements and the govern-
ment has a sufficiently important interest in the regulation of the non-
speech element .
impermissibly restricted expressive conduct); see also supra note 109 (citing additional
cases in which strict scrutiny was applied).
113. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
114. See id. at 256-58.
115. See id. at 244. The Florida "right of reply" statute provided that if a newspaper
attacked a candidate's personal character or official record, the candidate had the right to
reply to such allegations. See id. The right to reply entitled the candidate to demand that
the same newspaper print a reply free of charge. See id. The statute required the newspa-
per to print the reply in a conspicuous location and in the same kind of print as the original
charges. See id. A newspaper that failed to comply with the statute was guilty of a first-
degree misdemeanor. See id.
116. See id. at 256.
117. See id. at 258. The Court specifically stated that "the Florida statute fails to clear
the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors."
Id.
118. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (detailing the intermediate level of
scrutiny used for content-neutral regulations).
119. Cf. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in result) ("A licensing standard which gives an official authority to censor the content of a
speech differs toto coelo from one limited by ... non-discriminating practice, to considera-
tions of public safety and the like.").
120. Cf Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(stating that content-neutral regulations do not violate the First Amendment if they regu-
late without regard to content, are narrowly tailored, and allow information to be ex-
pressed through "alternative channels").
121. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). The O'Brien Court also
rejected the assertion that "an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
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B. The Difference Between Broadcast Media and Traditional Speech
Because television broadcasters transmit speech, the broadcast me-
dium is implicated within the meaning of the First Amendment.22
Moreover, in the First Amendment context, broadcasting is a unique
medium of expression.12 ' Accordingly, the Court has determined that the
First Amendment rights of broadcasters are not equal to "the right of
every individual to speak, write, or publish.' 24  The justification for
treating television differently stems from three different theories: publicoweshp 2 .126'° 121
ownership,"' scarcity, and the pervasiveness rationale.
'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."
Id.
122. Cf. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (stating
that the First Amendment's freedom of press guaranty includes the medium of "moving
pictures"). The Court has interpreted the First Amendment to encompass all forms of
mass media communication within the meaning of "the press." See DONALD M.
GILLMOR ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 9 (5th ed. 1990); see also WALTER S.
BAER, TECHNOLOGY'S CHALLENGES TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (1992) (noting that
the contemporary meaning of "speech" in the context of the First Amendment includes
radio and television broadcasting, cable networks, facsimile transmission over telephone
lines, computer-based desktop publishing, and high-speed printing presses).
123. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2386
(1996) (plurality opinion) (examining the reasons why broadcasting is afforded different
First Amendment protections than other media).
124. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969). One commentator noted
that:
The First Amendment commands that Congress shall make no law abridging
freedom of speech or of the press. The courts, however, historically have allowed
a greater degree of governmental intervention with respect to broadcast content
than with traditional print media on the theory that "differences in the charac-
teristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standard ap-
plied to them."
Robert Corn-Revere, Red Lion and the Culture of Regulation, in RATIONALES AND
RATIONALIZATIONS 1 (Robert Corn-Revere ed., 1997). Because broadcasting is afforded
a lesser degree of First Amendment protection, restrictions often are imposed on the in-
dustry that would be unacceptable if applied to the print media. See LEE C. BOLLINGER,
IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 71-73 (1991) [hereinafter BOLLINGER, FREE PRESS]; see also
Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1976) (noting the drastic disparity
with respect to the constitutional safeguards applicable to the print and broadcast media)
[hereinafter Bollinger, Regulation of Mass Media].
125. See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text (discussing the public ownership
rationale).
126. See infra notes 137-56 and accompanying text (discussing the scarcity rationale).
127. See infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text (discussing the pervasive presence
theory).
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1. Public Ownership Rationale
Employment of more liberal First Amendment standards to broad-
casting is illustrated by Congress's power to allocate broadcast licenses
selectively.1 18 Unlike traditional modes of communication, broadcast fre-
quencies are scarce resources because of the physical limitations of the
electromagnetic spectrum.29 Therefore, in order to facilitate meaningful
communication and to prevent the engineering chaos that would ensue
by interfering signals, the government must regulate the use of broadcast
channels.3 These limitations require the allocation of spectrum space to
a limited number of broadcasters."' Accordingly, governmental alloca-
tion necessarily means that some will be permitted to broadcast and oth-
ers will not.
13 2
128. See BOLLINGER, FREE PRESS, supra note 124, at 70 (discussing the Supreme
Court's approach to broadcast regulation in Red Lion). With respect to broadcast licens-
ing, the Commission has noted that:
The airwaves belong to the public, not to any individual broadcaster. As the Su-
preme Court observed in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, "a licensed broadcaster is 'granted
the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain;
when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations."'
The fact that Congress elected to retain public ownership of the broadcast spec-
trum and to lease it for free to private licensees for limited periods carries signifi-
cant First Amendment consequences.
Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 149 (internal footnotes omitted).
129. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388; cf Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
637-39 (1994) (plurality opinion) (concluding that the limited First Amendment protec-
tions applicable to broadcasters do not apply to cable operators because the cable medium
is not a scarce resource). But see Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116
S. Ct. 2374, 2386 (1996) (plurality opinion) (applying the broadcast rationale to cable
regulations designed to protect children from indecent programming).
130. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375-76. Prior to 1927, the allocation of radio frequen-
cies was in the hands of the private sector. See id. at 375. The government assumed con-
trol over regulating the airways to dispel the confusion engendered by the overburdened
use of the electromagnetic spectrum. See THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, supra note
4, at 11. Congress responded to the public outcry by enacting the Communications Act of
1934 which created and empowered the FCC to regulate the airways. See id.
131. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984). The basic unit of
measure of electromagnetic radiation is cycles per second or hertz (Hz). See MARC A.
FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, CASES AND MATERIAL ON MASS MEDIA LAW 630
(4th ed. 1990). The system of measure of electromagnetic radiation is as follows:
One KiloHertz (KHz) = 1,000 Hz
One MegaHertz (MHz) = 1,000 KHz
One GigaHertz (GHz) = 1,000 MHz
See id. The radio spectrum is comprised of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation,
ranging from 10kHz to 3,000 GHz. See id. With existing technology, only the frequencies
from 10 KHz to approximately 40 GHz may be used. See id.
132. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 377; see also National Broad. Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943) (admonishing that not every denial for alloca-
tion of a broadcast license constitutes abridgment of free speech).
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The public ownership rationale cannot justify affording broadcasters
less First Amendment protection.'33 Not all government-controlled
property is afforded limited First Amendment protection."' For exam-
ple, although the government regulates the parks and the sidewalks, such
control does not empower the government to censor based on the con-
tent of speech.135 Thus, the Supreme Court has not used the governmen-
tal control rationale to uphold its unique restriction of First Amendment




Justice Frankfurter announced the scarcity rationale'37 in National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States.18 The National Broadcasting majority
upheld special regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chainI" • 140
broadcasting 139 due to the scarcity of broadcast frequencies. Because
the electromagnetic spectrum is a scarce resource that can be used effec-
tively by only a limited number of speakers simultaneously, licensees are
granted the use of the spectrum contingent on the understanding that
133. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 199 (1987).
134. Cf. id. (noting that the public ownership rationale cannot justify the disparate
treatment of broadcast television).
135. See id.
136. See id. at 199-200.
137. President Clinton commented on the future of broadcasting prior to the 1992
election:
As you know, the distinction between broadcasting and publishing in terms of
the First Amendment is based on the scarcity principle. Free over-the-air broad-
casting will continue to be a vital part of our media, and availability of licenses
will continue to be limited. When that changes, the distinction between broad-
casting and print will change too.
Clinton on Communications, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept. 23, 1996, at 22.
138. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). Characterizing the confusion that ensued after Secretary
Hoover abandoned all attempts to regulate radio stations, Justice Frankfurter noted that
"[t]he result was confusion and chaos. With everybody on the air, nobody could be
heard." Id. at 212.
139. See id. at 194 n.1 (defining "chain broadcasting" as the "simultaneous broadcast-
ing of an identical program by two or more connected stations").
140. See id. at 213 (noting that the regulation is necessary to prevent interference be-
tween signals because the spectrum "simply is not large enough to accommodate every-
body"). But see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the Woods: Broadcasters, Bureaucrats,
and Children's Television Programming, 45 DuKE L.J. 1193, 1206 (1996) (noting that
"[ilt... makes little sense to continue holding television broadcasters hostage to some sort
of second class status under the First Amendment on the theory that they hold an effective
monopoly on access to the marketplace of ideas").
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In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,142 the Supreme Court unani-
mously reaffirmed the applicability of the scarcity rationale. 143 Red Lion
involved the refusal of a Pennsylvania radio station to grant reply time to
an individual the station publicly assailed on the air.1" The Court relied
on the fairness doctrine to justify imposing the affirmative obligation of
providing full and fair coverage of opposing viewpoints on issues of pub-
lic importance. 45 The Court, in reaffirming the fairness doctrine, upheld
141. National Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 216-17 (citing FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309
U.S. 134, 138 n.2 (1940)).
142. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
143. See id. at 400-01 (holding that regulations that impose affirmative obligations on
broadcasters are constitutional because of the "scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Gov-
ernment's role in allocating those broadcast frequencies, and the legitimate claims of
those, unable without governmental assistance, to gain access to those frequencies for ex-
pression of their views").
144. See id. at 371-72. The radio station aired a broadcast by the Reverend Billy
James Hargis during which a book authored by Fred J. Cook entitled, "Goldwater-Ex-
tremist on the Right," was discussed. See id. During the broadcast, Hargis claimed that
Cook had been fired by a newspaper for making false charges against New York City offi-
cials; that after losing his job he worked for a Communist-affiliated publication; that he
had defended Alger Hiss; that he had attacked J. Edgar Hoover and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency; and that Cook had written the book to "smear and destroy Barry Goldwa-
ter." Id. at 371.
145. See id. at 377-78. During the Red Lion litigation, the FCC issued a Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making aiming to more precisely set forth rules governing political editorials,
and to more clearly define the personal attack component of the fairness doctrine. See id.
at 373. The FCC adopted the proposed rules with only minor changes. See id. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, found the rules uncon-
stitutional. See Radio Television News Dirs. Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1020
(1968), rev'd, Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Consequently, the FCC
amended the rules as follows:
When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public impor-
tance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal
qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a reasonable
time and in no event later than 1 week after the attack, transmit to the person or
group attacked (1) notification of the date, time and identification of the broad-
cast; (2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape is not avail-
able) of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond over
the licensee's facilities.
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 373-74.
The fairness doctrine, which was repealed in 1987, required broadcasters to air contro-
versial public issues. See Toni Elizabeth Gilbert, Note, Economic Regulation of the Cable
Television Industry: Reigning in a Giant at the Expense of the First Amendment, 45 CATH.
U. L. REv. 615, 630 n.81 (1996). Furthermore, the doctrine required that broadcasters
provide contrasting viewpoints on those issues. See id. The fairness doctrine stemmed
from the government's attempts to regulate discussions of political issues over the televi-
sion and radio. See id.
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a regulation that required broadcasters to furnish reply time to an indi-
vidual attacked on television or the radio.146
The Red Lion Court upheld the fairness doctrine based in part, upon
the scarcity rationale.' 7 The Court concluded that the First Amendment
does not prevent Congress or the FCC from placing affirmative obliga-
tions on a broadcast licensee, even if the obligations constitute content-. 148
based restraints. Accordingly, licensees who are granted use of the
electromagnetic spectrum must serve as public fiduciaries by airing pro-
grams of public concern.149 The Red Lion decision illustrated the Court's
willingness to depart from settled principles of First Amendment juris-
prudence with respect to evaluating the constitutionality of radio and
television broadcasting regulations.5
The Court reaffirmed the scarcity rationale for increased regulation of
television broadcasting in FCC v. League of Women Voters.5' At issue
was a statute that prohibited a noncommercial broadcasting station that
received a grant from the Corporation of Public Broadcasting from en-
gaging in editorializing."' The Supreme Court held that the statute was
In Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, the Supreme Court held the fairness doctrine constitu-
tional. See 395 U.S. at 400-01. In 1984, the Supreme Court retreated from its holding in
Red Lion and stated that it would reconsider this holding at the request of Congress or the
Commission. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378 n.12 (1984). The
Commission determined in a 1985 report that the fairness doctrine did not effectuate the
public interest, and, furthermore, may not survive First Amendment scrutiny. See Gilbert,
supra, at 630 n.81. The FCC concluded that the actual effect of the fairness doctrine was
to chill broadcasters' speech. See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit subsequently
held that the Communications Act, as amended, never imposed a fairness doctrine obliga-
tion upon broadcasters. See Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801
F.2d 501, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The FCC's later decision to repeal the fairness doctrine
was upheld by the D.C. Circuit in 1989. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654,
659 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding the FCC determination without considering the issue of
the doctrine's constitutionality by determining that the fairness doctrine no longer served
the public interest); see also Gilbert, supra, at 630 n.81. Although Congress considered
codifying the fairness doctrine in the Communications Act, it declined to do so after the
President threatened to veto any such act. See Gilbert, supra, at 630 n.81.
146. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386, 400-01.
147. See id. at 388-89, 396-401.
148. See id. at 390.
149. See id. at 389.
150. See id. at 386 (noting that because broadcast media differs from other forms of
media, the nature of the First Amendment protections given to broadcast media is differ-
ent as well).
151. 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984).
152. See id. Section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 prohibited any non-
commercial educational broadcasting station that received a grant from the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting from engaging in editorializing. See 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1994)
(amended 1988). In 1988, Congress amended § 399 by removing the provisions that pro-
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not narrowly tailored to address the government's suggested interests
without unnecessarily abridging other forms of protected expression.53
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that the scarcity ra-
tionale had come under attack given the emergence of cable and satellite
television. 54 The Court refused, nevertheless, to reconsider its long-
standing First Amendment standard for broadcasting. Curiously, the
Court pointed to Congress or the FCC to reconsider the unique broad-
casting doctrine. 56
3. The Pervasiveness Rationale
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation57 marked the first and only time that the
Supreme Court departed from the scarcity rationale. 8 The Supreme
Court upheld the limited First Amendment protection applied to radio
broadcasters, not only because broadcasting is scarce, but also because of
the uniquely accessible, or pervasive' 9 presence of television in the lives
of Americans.' 6° The Pacifica Court noted that broadcasting material is
unique in that it confronts an individual in the privacy of the home. 6'
Relying on an individual's right to be left alone in the home, the Court
upheld an FCC declaratory order that banned the afternoon broadcast of
162indecent messages. The FCC order placed extensive restrictions on ob-
hibited editorializing by non-commercial educational broadcasting stations. See id.
153. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 398-99.
154. See id. at 376 n.ll. The Court noted that because new technologies have been
developed that allow for more stations to broadcast, critics have argued that the scarcity
doctrine is obsolete. See id.; see also Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace
Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 221-226 (1982) (discussing de-
fects in the scarcity rationale).
155. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376 n.il.
156. See id.; see also POWE, supra note 133, at 197 (noting that the Court in League of
Women Voters appealed to Congress or the FCC to "bail it out").
157. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
158. See POWE, supra note 133, at 209; see also Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298, 304 (1974) (validating a city ordinance that prohibited political advertisements in a
city transit system based on a rationale similar to that applied in Pacifica, namely, that the
commuters constitute a "captive audience").
159. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1009 (3d ed. 1988) (defining perva-
sive as "tending to pervade or spread throughout"); see also THE MEDIA AND THE LAW
33-34 (Howard Simons & Joseph A. Califano, Jr., eds., 1976) (arguing that "the unprece-
dented power of television communication" readily distinguishes the broadcast and print
media).
160. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
161. See id. at 748-49 (noting that an "individual's right to be left alone plainly out-
weighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder").
162. See id. at 732-33, 748-51. The FCC asserted its power to regulate the radio broad-
cast after determining that an afternoon broadcast of a satiric monologue was indecent
and prohibited by federal law. See id. at 732.
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scene, indecent, and profane broadcasting, including a complete ban on
indecent programming during the hours when children are likely to be in
the audience.163 These hours were later determined to be between 6:00
A.M. and 10:00 P.M.16
C. Application of First Amendment Principles to the FCC's 1996
Children's Television Regulations
The FCC's 1996 children's television regulations acknowledge two
First Amendment arguments: (1) that the FCC's authority granted in the
CTA to enforce the television broadcaster's obligation to provide educa-
tional and informational programming for children is unconstitutional;
and (2) that the quantification of this obligation imposed by the FCC is
unconstitutional . In promulgating the new regulations, the FCC dis-
missed the first argument concerning the obligation of broadcasters un-
der the CTA.'66 The FCC noted that Congress had concluded that when
considering a license renewal application, the First Amendment permits
the FCC to consider whether a television broadcaster has provided suffi-
cient educational and informational programming designed for chil-
dren. Furthermore, the FCC noted that Congress, like the courts, has
determined that requiring children's informational and educational pro-
gramming is within the public interest obligation of television broadcast-
ers. 61 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not considered the constitu-
tionality of the CTA and the FCC's regulations. 6' Because the Supreme
Court, rather than Congress, is ultimately charged with determining the
constitutionality of statutes and regulations,"7 the constitutionality of
163. See id. at 730-33. The Pacifica Court emphasized that the unique accessibility of
broadcasting to children supported the difference in First Amendment principles between
broadcast and print media. See id. at 748-49. The Supreme Court previously recognized in
Ginsberg v. New York that government regulation of otherwise protected expression is
constitutionally permissible, in part, due to the government's compelling interest in pro-
tecting the "well-being of its youth." 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968).
164. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 669-70 (D.C. Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996).




169. See Kennard & Nuechterlein, supra note 25, at 29 (noting that the FCC is merely
following Congress's constitutional judgment in establishing its well-defined three-hour
requirement).
170. But cf. id. (noting that the broadcast industry's quarrel with children's television is
with Congress, rather than with the FCC because Congress has supplied the "constitu-
tional path" that the FCC must follow with respect to the CTA).
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both the CTA and the FCC's regulations are still a genuine Firstm , . • 171
Amendment issue.
1. Analysis of the FCC's Children's Broadcasting Rules Under the Strict
Scrutiny Standard
The analysis of the children's television regulations under a strict scru-
tiny standard would afford television broadcasters the same constitu-
tional protections applicable to newspapers.172 Assuming this standard
applies, the question becomes whether the government can compel a
newspaper to publish a specific column or allocate a specific portion of
its publication to particular subjects. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,73 the Court held that the First Amendment bars such govern-
mental regulation. 174 In Tornillo, the Court struck down a state statute
that forced newspapers to forgo publication of other news. 175 In holding
the statute unconstitutional, the Court noted that the government hadS 171
intruded improperly upon the guarded province of newspaper editors.
Thus, under the strict scrutiny standard typically applied to the print me-
dium, the FCC's educational television regulations for children are un-
constitutional. Like the regulation at issue in Tornillo, the three-hour
minimum weekly requirement forces broadcasters to forgo broadcasting
other programs.171
171. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (holding that "it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say [sic] what the law
is").
172. Government regulations of print media are subject to the traditional strict scru-
tiny standard. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1994) (applying
the strict scrutiny standard); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
(finding a state right-of-reply statute invalid under strict scrutiny analysis); see also
Gilbert, supra note 145, at 628 (discussing the application of the strict scrutiny standard to
print media). The Supreme Court recently has held that government regulations of the
Internet are also subject to the strict scrutiny test rather than the more liberal test for
broadcast media. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997) (noting that the Inter-
net, unlike broadcast, "can hardly be considered a 'scarce' expressive commodity").
173. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
174. See id. at 258.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 256-58.
177. Cf. id. at 259 (White, J. concurring) ("According to our accepted jurisprudence,
the First Amendment erects a virtually insurmountable barrier between government and
the print media so far as government tampering, in advance of publication, with news and
editorial content is concerned.").
178. Compare id. at 256-58 (invalidating a statute that would require newspapers to
print right-of-reply articles and thus forgo publication of other material the editors may
have preferred to publish), with Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 150 (noting that
the CTA requires broadcasters to air programs "they might not otherwise choose to pro-
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Under a strict scrutiny standard, a regulation that compels a broad-
caster to forgo other programming will survive only if the regulation ad-
vances a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to ef-
fectuate that interest without restricting other protected forms of
expression. 9 As the Commission observed, the purpose of the CTA is to
harness the power of television to "benefit society by helping to educate
and inform our children." '  Such a goal constitutes a compelling gov-
ernmental interest because the Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized
an interest in protecting children."'
Whether the FCC's regulations are narrowly tailored to achieve this in-
terest in educating and informing children is uncertain. A content-based
restriction is sufficiently narrow as long as it is "designed to serve [com-
pelling governmental] interests without unnecessarily interfering with
First Amendment freedoms.""1 2 Under this prescription, the government
may not regulate speech so that a substantial portion of the burden does
not serve to advance its stated interests.
Applying this standard to children's television, the FCC's regulations
are not sufficiently narrow to survive the strict scrutiny standard. The
three-hour requirement does not serve the compelling governmental in-
terest of educating and informing children for two reasons: (1) television
is a poor educator;8' and (2) some of the programming that satisfies the
FCC's broad criteria is far from educational or informational."' There-
vide").
179. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text (discussing the strict scrutiny stan-
dard).
180. Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 9.
181. The Supreme Court traditionally has recognized protecting the well-being of chil-
dren as a compelling government interest. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,
117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
(re-affirming that protecting minors from indecent interstate commercial telephone mes-
sages, such as "dial-a-porn," is a compelling governmental interest).
182. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126 (stating that "it is not enough to show that
the Government's ends are compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to achieve
those ends").
183. See id.
184. Cf LESSER, supra note 15, at 44-47 (reviewing research studies that question the
efficacy of the popular children's television program, Sesame Street, as an effective educa-
tional tool). Dorothy G. Singer, Television and the Developing Imagination of the Child, in
CHILDREN AND TELEVISION 229-233 (John C. Wright & Aletha C. Huston eds., 3d ed.
1983) (citing clinical research suggesting that television may hinder the development of
childhood creativity, frustrate early scholastic performance, and encourage aggressive or
anti-social behavior).
185. The government's ability to choose educational programming for children must
be questioned when Congress designated the Smurfs and Pee Wee's Playhouse as pro-
grams that satisfy the criteria for children's educational and informational programming.
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fore, by imposing such speech restrictions on broadcasters, the govern-
ment fails to satisfy the "narrowly tailored" requirement under the strict
scrutiny test.186  Accordingly, the restrictions imposed on television
broadcasters under the CTA cannot withstand the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review. 87
2. The Current Role of the First Amendment in Television
Broadcasting: A "Watered Down" Approach to the Strict Scrutiny
Standard
Under modern First Amendment principles, television broadcasting is
not subject to the traditional strict scrutiny standard.1 8 Broadcast televi-
sion is subject to the more liberal standard articulated in Red Lion.1
89
This less stringent level of scrutiny balances the interests of the broad-
casters as private entrepreneurs against the interest of the government in
ensuring that each broadcaster acts as a trustee for the public.'9 Thus, if
the regulation on speech is reasonably related to the government's inter-
est in ensuring broadcasters serve as public trustees, it is permissible un-
der the First Amendment.' 9'
See S. REP. No. 101-227, at 7-8 (1989).
186. See supra notes 172-83 and accompanying text (discussing the strict scrutiny stan-
dard).
187. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text (discussing generally the strict
scrutiny standard of review of content-based restrictions); see also supra notes 21-35 and
accompanying text (discussing the CTA's requirements).
188. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text (describing the difference between
television broadcasting and traditional speech). Compare Justice Douglas's statement re-
garding his view of the First Amendment in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic National Committee:
What kind of First Amendment would best serve our needs as we approach
the 21st century may be an open question. But the old-fashioned First Amend-
ment that we have is the Court's only guideline; and one hard and fast principle
which it announces is that Government shall keep its hands off the press. That
principle has served us through days of calm and eras of strife and I would abide
by it until a new First Amendment is adopted. That means, as I view it, that TV
and radio, as well as the more conventional methods for disseminating news, are
all included in the concept of "press" as used in the First Amendment and there-
fore are entitled to live under the laissez-faire regime which the First Amend-
ment sanctions.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 160-61 (1973).
189. See Campaign Finance Reform Proposals of 1996: Hearings on Proposals Per-
taining to the Financing of Senate Election Campaigns Before the Senate Committee on
Rules and Administration, 104th Cong. 418 (1996) [hereinafter Hearings] (statements of
Henry Geller) ("[B]roadcasting does not come within that traditional First Amendment
jurisprudence. It has its own unique jurisprudence and that is very liberal.").
190. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,388-91 (1969).
191. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (noting that broadcasters,
unlike other speakers, can be deprived of their licenses "if the Commission decides that
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Applying this balancing test to the children's television restrictions on
broadcasters, the decisive issue is whether the restrictions are reasonably
related to serving the public interest92 The FCC regulations, along with
the CTA itself, impose reasonable conditions on broadcasters that are
reasonably related to advancing the government's interest in "the educa-
tion of America's children." '193 Requiring broadcasters to air only three
hours of children's broadcasting a week, only about two and a half per-
cent of the entire schedule, is not excessively burdensome within the
meaning of the First Amendment.94
Furthermore, the restrictions Congress and the FCC adopted to ad-
vance the education of America's children, also may be justified under
the Supreme Court's analysis in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.1 95 Indeed,
the guidelines adopted by the FCC, pursuant to the CTA, impose less of
a burden on broadcasters than the FCC regulation that the Court held
valid in Pacifica.116 As opposed to the sixteen-hour complete ban of in-
decent programming approved in Pacifica, the FCC's children's televi-
sion regulations require only a half-hour of designated children's pro-
gramming during a fifteen-hour time period. 91 Moreover, the CTA itself
is even less burdensome because it does not impose quantitative dura-
tional standards for children's programs.!
Accordingly, when subjected to the liberal First Amendment standard
applicable to broadcast, the CTA and the FCC's regulations promulgated
thereunder weigh in favor of promoting the government's interest in the
such an action would serve 'the public interest, convenience, and necessity'); see also
FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946) (explaining that, when the FCC determines
whether a station's operations serve the public interest for licensing purposes, "considera-
tion must be given to the character, background and training of all parties having an inter-
est in the proposed license"); cf. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 155
(1969) (noting that the Alabama Supreme Court, by narrowly construing an ordinance
requiring a permit to parade as one regulating city traffic, saved the ordinance from being
stricken as violative of the First Amendment because traffic regulations applied in a non-
discriminatory manner are content-neutral regulations); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S.
313, 325 (1958) (invalidating an ordinance that prohibited solicitation without a permit,
subject to the "uncontrolled discretion" of city officials).
192. Cf. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943) (determining that denial of a
broadcast license on grounds that a licensee has engaged in certain broadcasting practices
that are inconsistent with serving the public interest does not constitute a denial of free
speech).
193. Report and Order, supra note 11, paras. 152-53.
194. See id. paras. 156-57.
195. See id.
196. See id. para. 156.
197. See id.
198. See 47 U.S.C. § 303a (1994).
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education of America's children.'9 Thus, the government action is con-
stitutional under the First Amendment.0 Therefore, avoidance of such
government action can be accomplished only by the reversal of Red Lion
and, consequently, an analysis under a traditional strict scrutiny stan-
dard.201
IV. RETURNING TELEVISION TO THE LEVEL OF SOAPBOX EXPRESSION
Under the rationale for regulating broadcast content in the public in-
terest, a government restriction that is otherwise unconstitutional under
the traditional strict scrutiny standard is transformed into a perfectly
constitutional restriction.'O The transformation results from the First
Amendment distinction between broadcast media and other types of
protected expression. This distinction is premised on the physical scar-
204city of the electromagnetic spectrum.
A. A Retreat from the Scarcity Rationale
The scarcity rationale that gave rise to earlier Supreme Court decisions
/ • • 205
is rapidly disappearing. For at least fifty years after the advent of
broadcasting, there was no other form of electronic mass media. 6 Since
then, broadcast outlets have increased with the creation of over 11,500
201
broadcast radio stations and almost 1,600 television stations 7. Cable
television 20 and digital technology make the current opportunities to
199. See Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 149.
200. See id. para. 157.
201. See Hearings, supra note 189, at 424 (statement of Henry Geller).
202. See Robert Corn-Revere, Regulation in Newspeak: The FCC's Children's Televi-
sion Rules, POLICY ANALYSIS (CATO Institute, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 19, 1997, at 12
(noting that "content regulation has been allowed for broadcasting that would be unthink-
able for the print medium").
203. See Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 509
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
204. See id.
205. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.l (1984). The Court
in League of Women Voters stated that:
The prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation based on spectrum scarcity has
come under increasing criticism in recent years. Critics, including the incumbent
Chairman of the FCC, charge that with the advent of cable and satellite televi-
sion technology, communities now have access to such a wide variety of stations
that the scarcity doctrine is obsolete.
Id.; see also Fowler & Brenner, supra note 154, at 221-26 (discussing the shortcomings of
the scarcity rationale).
206. See Hearings, supra note 189, at 435 (statement of P. Cameron DeVore).
207. See id. at 422 (statement of Henry Geller).
208. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2386
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broadcast virtually limitless.2°9 The advent of the Internet also has vastly
increased the number and availability of electronic mass media outlets.21
All of these considerations greatly undermine the scarcity rationale for
broadcast regulation. 1
Even if broadcast frequencies are scarce in comparison to print or pure
speech, this theory alone should not support restrictions on broadcasting
that the Court has held impermissible if applied to any other medium.
212
Many modes of communication are scarce in the sense that some willing
speakers lack the opportunity to speak. The sidewalks surrounding the
Supreme Court are scarce, for example, yet restrictions on the content of
views expressed on these sidewalks are upheld only after analysis under a
strict form of judicial review."3 The First Amendment's guaranty of
freedom of speech protects the rights of individuals on the sidewalk to
express themselves through speech or silence. 4 Thus, the government
cannot force an individual wearing a sandwich board. 5 on the sidewalk to
216
reserve a portion of the board for someone else's speech. The chil
dren's television regulations, unlike the sidewalks surrounding the Su-
(1996) (plurality opinion) (citing research studies indicating that cable television is in sixty-
three percent of American homes); see also Fabrikant, supra note 16, at D8 (noting that
about two-thirds of American homes have cable).
209. See Krotoszynski, supra note 140, at 1205.
210. See id.; cf Fabrikant, supra note 16, at D1 (noting that home computers are at
least partially responsible for the recent decline in child television viewers).
211. See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text. But see Kennard & Nuechterlein,
supra note 25, at 30 (noting that "one-third of America still relies exclusively on the air-
waves for television programming").
212. See Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
213. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
Public places such as streets, sidewalks, and parks are considered public forums. See
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). In such places, the government may en-
force reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as the restrictions "are con-
tent-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave
open ample alternative channels of communication." Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; see also supra
notes 104-107 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between content-neutral
and content-based restrictions).
214. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that a state could not
require plaintiffs to display the state motto "Live Free or Die" on their vehicle -license
plates); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding unconstitu-
tional a Florida statute placing an affirmative duty upon newspapers to publish the replies
of political candidates whom they had criticized).
215. A sandwich board is defined as "two connected posters or sign-boards that hang
in front of and behind a person and usually bear some advertisement, notice, exhortation,
or the like." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1699 (2d
ed. 1987).
216. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (noting that the freedom of speech in-
cludes the freedom not to speak).
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preme Court, are not subjected to the strict scrutiny test and force the
television broadcaster to finance a message prescribed by the govern-
ment."7
Because scarcity is prevalent to a degree in many communications me-
dia, all forms of media should be regulated consistently. Employing
the scarcity rationale to distinguish among the different forms of media,
when all forms are subject to resource scarcity, is logically inconsistent.29
Thus, it "makes little sense to continue holding television broadcasters
hostage" to a lesser form of First Amendment protection under the scar-
city rationale.2
B. Let the Viewers Decide
The premise behind the public interest balancing test of Red Lion
completely disregards the current structure of commercial broadcast-
ing. The Red Lion Court articulated the principle that the First
Amendment precludes broadcasters from maintaining "an effective mo-
nopoly on access to the marketplace of ideas" transmitted over the pub-
222lic airways. This theory presupposes that a broadcaster's only motiva-
tion for speaking is to advocate a certain view. This myopic rationale
221ignores the nature of commercial broadcast television. Most of televi-
sion programming is offered to the public in an effort to sell advertising
224time. Broadcasters transmit speech to facilitate a commercial transac-
tion: the bundling and selling of audiences to advertisers.2 5 Any theory
of diminished First Amendment rights must acknowledge the reality that
217. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text (outlining the less stringent level of
scrutiny afforded to television broadcasting).
218. See Telecommunication Research and Action Ctr. V. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C.
Cir. 1986). See generally R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 14 (1959) (noting that scarcity of resources is a common economic occurrence).
219. See Telecommunications Research, 801 F.2d at 508.
220. Krotoszynski, supra note 140, at 1206.
221. See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text (describing the technological de-
velopments that undermine the scarcity rationale).
222. Krotoszynski, supra note 140, at 1206; see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 391 (1969) (discussing the public interest rationale).
223. See ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC ASPECrS OF TELEVISION REGULATION
10-11 (1973) (arguing that "[t]he sale of advertising now governs the extent of diversity on
commercial television").
224. See KRATTENMAKER, supra note 3, at 21 (maintaining that the "driving force" in
the broadcast industry is broadcast revenue); Clinton's Push for More Kid TV, supra note
12, at 22 (noting that broadcasters are reluctant to air children's programs that produce
lower ratings and, thus, lower revenues).
225. See NOLL ET AL, supra note 223, at 10-11 & n.26.
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broadcasters will instinctively air programs that attract the most viewers,
and, thus, generate the most revenue dollars."'
C. The Children's Broadcasting Requirements May Allow for the Demise
of Red Lion
Although Red Lion has been severely criticized, it has not been re-
versed.227  Recently, the Court and commentators have retreated from
the special treatment afforded broadcasters in Red Lion. Although the
Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC Court failed to modify its previous
First Amendment standard applicable to broadcast, the Court did an-
nounce the application of a different standard to cable television that
seems to undermine the scarcity rationale.9 Furthermore, the FCC v.
226. See id. Editorial decisions are driven by market demand to maximize advertising
revenue by selling advertising time associated with programming that enjoys large audi-
ences. See id.
227. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984) (recognizing
criticism of the scarcity rationale, but refusing to abandon the rationale); Krotoszynski,
supra note 140, at 1206 (noting that it "makes little sense to continue holding television
broadcasters hostage to some sort of second class status under the First Amendment on
the theory that they hold an effective monopoly on access to the marketplace of ideas").
228. See Robert M. O'Neil, Dead or Alive: How Long Will the RED LION Specter
Haunt Free Speech and Broadcasting?, in RATIONALES AND RATIONALIZATIONS, supra
note 124, at 34-35 (discussing the Court's possible retreat from Red Lion in Turner Broad-
cast. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)).
229. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638 (1994) (declining to apply
the scarcity rationale to justify lessened First Amendment rights for cable providers). In
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Court considered the constitutionality of
must-carry cable provisions that require cable systems to allocate some channels to local
broadcasters. See id. at 626. The Turner Court classified the must-carry regulations in the
1992 Cable Act as content-neutral regulations that impose "incidental" restrictions on free
speech. See id. at 662. Therefore, the Court determined that the must-carry restrictions
were subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny that applies to time, place, and manner
restrictions. See id.; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (stating that the applicable test for time, place, and
manner regulations is whether the regulations are "justified without reference to the con-
tent of the regulated speech,.. . serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so
doing they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information").
Initially, the Court was forced to consider whether to evaluate the must-carry cable pro-
visions under the broadcast or print standard. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 637-41. The Court
stated that print media enjoys the highest level of protection under the First Amendment.
See id.; see also Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716-19 (1931) (noting that
because freedom of the press is an extremely important constitutional right, prior restraint
of this freedom will rarely be tolerated); FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE
BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 197 (1976) (arguing that Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC are indistinguishable).
Next, the Supreme Court explained that broadcast television, due to its unique character-
istics, receives the least amount of First Amendment protection. See Turner, 512 U.S. at
637-41; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (noting that "of all forms
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League of Women Voters2 30 Court directly questioned the continued ap-
plicability of the scarcity rationale and called upon Congress or the FCC
to reconsider the First Amendment standard for broadcasting.23'
As recent cases indicate, the Supreme Court may be willing to depart
from its long-standing First Amendment precedent applicable to broad-
casting.32 The new children's television regulations may give the Court
an opportunity to abandon the outdated scarcity rationale and afford
broadcast speech a greater level of protection.23 The CTA, alone, does
not furnish the Supreme Court an opportunity to overturn Red Lion.
Apparently, the CTA's unequivocal obligation does not compel televi-
sion broadcasters to pray for judicial relief. Nonetheless, the FCC is
treading on thin ice with the three-hour requirement. The flexibility in-
corporated into the regulation may keep broadcasters content for the
present time. The FCC's next step, however, may push television broad-
casters into the courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The children's television regulations imposed on broadcasters display
the apparent tension between a constitutional ideal of free speech and a
desire to educate America's youth. The scarcity rationale announced in
Red Lion still prevents broadcasters from sharing First Amendment
of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection"); Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1072 (1994) (noting that the scarcity of broad-
casting frequencies has justified the regulation of broadcasting). Interestingly, the Turner
Court never specified the exact level of protection afforded to cable television regarding
must-carry regulations. See Gary S. Lutzker, The 1992 Cable Act and the First Amend-
ment: What Must, Must Not, and May Be Carried, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 467, 493
& n.168 (1994).
After applying the intermediate level of scrutiny, the Court rejected the district court's
finding that the must-carry regulations were constitutional. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 668.
The Court stated that the record was insufficient to determine whether the Government
had satisfied its requisite level of intermediate scrutiny, and, thus, the Court held the grant
of summary judgment for the Government erroneous. See id.
230. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
231. See id. at 376 n.11 (indicating that the Court was not prepared to reconsider a
"longstanding approach without some signal from Congress or the FCC").
232. See id. at 367 n.11; see also O'Neil, supra note 228, at 19 (noting that scholars have
been generally skeptical concerning the continued validity of the Red Lion rationale).
233. Cf. O'Neil, supra note 228, at 34-38 (discussing the inevitable abandonment of
Red Lion).
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rights equal to other speakers. This outdated rationale is rapidly disap-
pearing due to the advent of other forms of electronic mass media. The
FCC's new regulation, however, may give the Court the opportunity to
reevaluate the lesser standard of free speech applied to television broad-
casters.

